JURY SELECTION-EXCLUSION OF
TAL SENTENCING CASES

No

POTENTIAL JURORS IN CAPI-

LONGER REQUIRES THAT VENIRE

MEMBERS EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY

WITH UNMISTAKABLE

CLARIT-Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct.

844 (1985).
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Witherspoon v. Illinois1 established the touchstone for deciding
when a potential juror may properly be excused for cause in
criminal trials involving the death penalty.2 The Witherspoon
Court held that a capital defendant's sixth' and fourteenth4
amendment right to an impartial jury in criminal trials involving
the death penalty is violated by the exclusion for cause of a
venireman who expresses general objections to the death sentence.5 Since then, however, the role of the capital sentencing
jury has been reduced to that of a trier of fact with little discretion 7in imposing the death penalty. 6 Recently, in Wainwright v.
Witt, the United States Supreme Court again addressed the issue
of when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause based
upon an expressed objection to the death penalty.8 In clarifying
the standard articulated in Witherspoon, the Witt Court held that
the proper "standard is whether the juror's views would 'prevent
or substantially impair the performance of his duties as ajuror in
accordance with his instructions and his oath.' "
In February of 1974, Johnny Paul Witt was convicted of the
first degree murder of an eleven-year-old boy.' 0 Based on the
I 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
2 See infra notes 31-45 and accompanying text (discussing Witherspoon).
3 The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-

cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
4 The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
5 See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 518, 522.

6 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (limiting jury discretion by requiring presence of specified aggravating circumstances before death sentence may be
imposed); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding unconstitutional state
statutes giving the jury absolute discretion in imposing the death penalty). For a
discussion of these cases, see infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
7 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985).

8 See id. at 847.
9 Id. at 852 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
l0 Witt v. State, 342 So. 2d 497, 500 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977). Witt
and his codefendant hid near a wooded road frequented by children and attacked a
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jury's recommendation," the trial judge sentenced Witt to death
on February 21, 1974.12 Witt appealed directly to the Supreme
Court of Florida, urging that his conviction be reversed for improper exclusion of jurors' in violation of the Witherspoon standard.' 4 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Witt's conviction
young boy who was riding a bicycle. Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 847. Binding and gagging
the victim, they placed him in their trunk and drove to a secluded area where they
discovered that the boy had been asphyxiated by the gag. Id. Both defendants then
proceeded to commit sexual acts upon the boy's body before burying him. Id.
I I Although in Florida the jury does not pass sentence, it does make a recommendation that the trial judge is required to consider. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(2) (West 1973). Thus, the Witherspoon standard was applicable. See generally Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 451-52 (1984) (outlining Florida's sentencing procedure).
12 Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11 th Cir. 1983), modified, 723 F.2d
769 (11th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985). Witt was sentenced to death
pursuant to FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1) (West 1976), which provided as follows:
(a) The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated from
a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or any
human being, or when committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any arson, involuntary sexual
battery, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful
throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb, or
which resulted from the unlawful distribution of heroin by a person 18
years of age or older when such drug is proven to be the proximate
cause of the death of the user, shall be murder in the first degree and
shall constitute a capital felony, punishable as provided in § 775.082.
(b) In all cases under this section, the procedure set forth in
§ 921.141 shall be followed in order to determine sentence of death or
life imprisonment.
Id.
13 Witt v. State, 342 So. 2d 497, 498 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977). Witt
also contended that (1) admission of his confession was improper because the state
did not provide proper representation, (2) the Florida test for competency to stand
trial was outdated, and (3) the sentence of death was excessive when compared with
the life sentence that Witt's codefendant received in a separate trial. Id. at 498-99.
14 Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 847; see infra notes 31-45 and accompanying text. Six potential jurors expressed their inability to prevent their feelings about capital punishment from being a factor in determining guilt or innocence. Witt v. State, 342
So. 2d 497,499 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977). Somejurors stated that they
could not recommend a sentence of death after weighing aggravating and mitigating factors as required by Florida law. Id. The relevant Florida statute provides as
follows:
After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an
advisory sentence to the court, based upon the following matters:
(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5);
(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and
(c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should
be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2) (West 1973).
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and sentence, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.1 5 Witt then attempted unsuccessfully to have his sentence
vacated, set aside, or corrected in a separate, postconviction relief proceeding. 16 The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed this
denial of relief, 17 and Witt was again refused certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court.' 8
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida denied Witt's subsequent petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.'" The district court later affirmed its prior memorandum
decision after an evidentiary hearing on the issue of potential juror exclusion.20 Witt then appealed the lower court's decision to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 2 '
Relying on the Witherspoon decision, the court of appeals determined that one of the potential jurors had been improperly excused for cause and therefore remanded the Witt case for
resentencing. 22 In addition, the court of appeals expressed uncertainty with respect to the issue of "whether a state trial court's
finding of bias should be accorded a presumption of correctness
under the federal statute governing habeas corpus
proceedings.'23

The State of Florida then petitioned the United States
15 See Witt v. State, 342 So. 2d 497 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977).
16 Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 924, 931 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
Witt's motion was based on issues other than juror exclusion. See id. He appealed
the trial court's denial of postconviction relief on the basis of several changes in the
law effected by decisions subsequent to his conviction. Id
17 Id.

18 Witt v. Florida, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
19 Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 847. The writ of habeas corpus, now codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241-2255 (1982), is provided for in the United States Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. It was first codified by Congress in the Judiciary Act of
1789, which gave Federal courts the power to issue relief to prisoners "in custody,
under or by colour of the authority of the United States." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) (1982)).
20 Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11 th Cir. 1983), modified, 723 F.2d
769 (11th Cir. 1984), revd, 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985).
21 Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 847.
22 Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069, 1082-84 (1 1th Cir. 1983), modified, 723
F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985). The court's decision was
based upon footnote 21 of the Witherspoon case and two prior circuit court cases,
Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003 (1982)
and Burns v. Estelle, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980), in which the Witherspoon standard was applied. See Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069, 1082-83 (11 th Cir. 1983),
modified, 723 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1984), revd, 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985).
23 Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 849; see Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069, 1083 n.10 (11 th
Cir. 1983), modified, 723 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1984), revd, 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985).
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Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.2 " The Court granted certiorari and ultimately reversed the court of appeals' decision.25
The Supreme Court held that the venireman in question had
been properly excused because she entertained reservations
about the death penalty that would have prevented her from performing the duties of a juror in accordance with her oath and
instructions.26 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted
that the standard for juror exclusion does not require that a
venireman's bias be established with unmistakable clarity.27 The
Court also held that in a habeas corpus proceeding, the question
of excusing a potential juror for cause is a factual issue requiring
Federal courts to accord
"a presumption of correctness" to the
28
state court's findings.

The sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to a trial by an impartial jury.2 9 This right applies to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.30 In 1968, the United
States Supreme Court, in Witherspoon v. Illinois,3 1 squarely addressed the issue of whether a state infringes upon this right
when a trial court excuses for cause all members of the venire
who express conscientious objections to capital punishment.32
Witherspoon involved an Illinois statute 33 that permitted the state
to "death qualify' 1' 4 a jury by excluding for cause any prospective
See Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 849.
Id.
26 Id. at 852, 855. The Court stressed that because a juror may not be able to
express verbally his feelings about the death penalty, the standard for exclusion
cannot be based simply on questions and answers. Id. at 852.
24

25

27

Id.

Id. at 853, 856. The statute governing habeas corpus proceedings requires
Federal courts to presume that any state court determination of a factual issue is
correct, unless one of eight enumerated exceptions applies. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) (1982).
28

29

U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI; see supra note 3.

The United States Supreme Court held the sixth amendment applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
31 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
32 See id. at 513. At the time Witherspoon was decided, most states with capital
punishment schemes allowed the exclusion ofjurors for cause merely because they
opposed the death penalty. See, e.g., People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1
(1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957); Commonwealth v. Ladetto, 349 Mass. 237,
207 N.E.2d 536 (1965); State v. Reynolds, 43 N.J. 597, 206 A.2d 750 (1965). See
generally Case Comment, Jury Selection-Witherspoon v. State of Illinois, 3 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 210, 214-15 (1968).
33 See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512 & n.1.
34 "Death qualify" is the term used to refer to "the exclusion for cause, in capital
30
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juror who expressed objections to the death penalty. 35 In an

opinion written by Justice Stewart, the Court noted that a juror
with personal objections to the death penalty would nevertheless
be able to put aside his beliefs and return a verdict of death. 36
The Witherspoon Court reasoned that under the procedure
for death qualification required by the Illinois statute, the resultingjury would not portray "the conscience of the community. 37
Rather, the Court opined that the jury would be one "uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die."'38 Emphasizing the
broad discretion given the Illinois jury to determine the proper
penalty, Justice Stewart noted the inevitable role ajuror's general
views on capital punishment play in such a decision.3 9 In reaching its ultimate conclusion, the Court noted that a juror need
only be able to consider the range of penalties allowed by state
law.4 ° Thus, the Court held that a jury from which veniremen
had been excluded for general objections to the death penalty

cases, ofjurors opposed to capital punishment." Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 860 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
35 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512.
36 Id. at 519. In footnote seven of its opinion, the Court stated,
It is entirely possible, of course, that even a juror who believes that capital punishment should never be inflicted and who is irrevocably committed to its abolition could nonetheless subordinate his personal views to
what he perceived to be his duty to abide by his oath as a juror and to
obey the law of the State.
Id. at 514-15 n.7. In addition, in footnote nine of its opinion, the Court noted,
"Obviously many jurors 'could, notwithstanding their conscientious scruples
[against capital punishment], return . . . [a] verdict [of death] and . . .make their

scruples subservient to their duty as jurors.' " Id. at 516 n.9 (quoting Stratton v.
People, 5 Colo. 276, 277 (1880)); cf. Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-QualifiedJury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1, 11 (1970) (survey showing that only 30% of scrupled jurors would
approve of acquitting a guilty defendant in order to avoid imposing the death
sentence).
37 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519. The Court expressed its concern by stating that
one of the most important functions any jury can perform in making
such a selection is to maintain a link between contemporary community
values and the penal system-a link without which the determination of
punishment could hardly reflect "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."
Id. at 519 n.15 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren, C.J.,
plurality opinion)).
38 Id. at 521. The sentence was characterized by the Court as resulting from "a
hangingjury." Id. at 523.
39 Id. at 519. For a discussion of the role a juror's general views on capital punishment play in sentencing decisions, see Schnapper, Taking Witherspoon Seriously:
The Search for Death-QualifiedJurors, 62 TEX. L. REV. 977, 997-99 (1984).
40 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
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could not constitutionally impose a death sentence.4
The Witherspoon Court noted, however, that its holding was a
narrow one." 2 In two celebrated footnotes, the majority limited
the scope of its holding to situations in which a state attempts to
exclude veniremen for cause merely on the basis that they expressed general objections to capital punishment or voiced religious or conscientious scruples against its infliction.43 In
footnote nine of the opinion, the Witherspoon majority qualified its
decision by observing that "[u]nless a venireman states unambiguously that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment no matter what the trial might reveal,
it simply cannot be assumed that that is his position."' 44 Later in
its opinion, the majority further qualified its decision by stating
in footnote twenty-one that its holding did not apply to situations
in which a juror would automatically vote against death or could
45
not remain impartial in determining guilt.

The Witherspoon Court's failure to articulate the specific level
of expressed opposition to the death penalty that was necessary
to exclude a potential juror for cause created a great deal of confusion in the lower courts. 46 In the two years after Witherspoon
was decided, the Supreme Court announced two decisions that
41 Id. at 522. Witherspoon's sentence was reversed, but his conviction was not
disturbed. See id. at 517-18, 523. The Court found inadequate empirical evidence
to sustain Witherspoon's claim that a jury from which scrupled jurors have been
excluded is more prone to convict. See id. at 517; cf.Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543, 545 (1968) (similarly rejecting petitioner's claim that a "death-qualified"
jury is more prone to convict). The Court recently decided that even if empirical
evidence established that death-qualified juries were more prone to convict capital
defendants, the conviction would still be upheld. See Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S.
Ct. 1758, 1764 (1986).
42 See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 513-14.
43 Id. at 522.
44 Id. at 516 n.9.
45 Id. at 522-23 n.21. The Court expressly stated that
nothing we say today bears upon the power of a State to execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which the only veniremen
who were in fact excluded for cause were those who made unmistakably
clear (1) that they would automaticallyvote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed
at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the
death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as
to the defendant's guilt.
Id.
46 See infra notes 58-75 and accompanying text. Many commentators, however,
considered the Witherspoon decision sufficiently clear. See, e.g., Comment, Unlawful
Discriminationinjury Selection- Witherspoon and Related Cases, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 73, 74
(1969); Voir Dire Examination of jurors in Capital Cases, 14 VILL. L. REV. 125, 130
(1968).
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added to this uncertainty by intimating that footnotes nine and
twenty-one set forth those instances when a juror may constitutionally be excluded for cause.47 In Boulden v. Holman,48 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the trial
court had erred by allowing in evidence the defendant's pretrial
confession.4 9 Once before the Supreme Court, however, the defendant raised the juror exclusion issue for the first time.5 0 The
Court noted that it appeared two jurors were properly excluded
because the voir dire questioning came within the parameters of
footnotes nine and twenty-one of Witherspoon.5 Although the
Court perceived that other jurors were improperly excluded, it
refused to decide whether a Witherspoon violation had in fact occurred because the issue had not been raised below.52
Similarly, in Maxwell v. Bishop,53 the Court observed in dictum that a potential juror had been improperly excluded based
on his answer to the following question: "[D]o you have any conscientious scruples about capital punishment that might prevent
you from returning... a verdict [of death]?" 54 The Court found
the questioning inadequate to disqualify the venireman under
Witherspoon.55 Once again, the Court articulated footnotes nine
and twenty-one as the proper test for excluding a juror. 56 As in
Boulden, however, the Supreme Court did not decide the Witherspoon issue, but remanded the case for further factual findings because the trial had occurred before Witherspoon had been
decided.57
Subsequently, footnotes nine and twenty-one of the Witherspoon decisions were construed by the lower courts in conjunction
with Boulden and Maxwell as defining the circumstances under
which a juror could constitutionally be excused for cause.58 The
Federal appellate courts have generally adopted a broad application of Witherspoon based upon a strict construction of footnotes
47
48
49
50

51
52

53
54
55
56

57
58

See infra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
394 U.S. 478 (1969).
Id. at 481.
Id.
Id. at 482.
Id. at 483-84.
398 U.S. 262 (1970).
Id. at 264.
Id.
Id. at 265-66.
Id. at 266-67.
See infra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
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nine and twenty-one of the opinion. 5 9 For instance, in Burns v.
Estelle, 6° the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a
potential juror who had expressly stated that she did not believe
in the death penalty was improperly excluded in violation of
Witherspoon.6 ' Despite the potential juror's testimony that her beliefs would have an effect on her consideration of any issue of
fact, the Burns court reasoned that further questioning might
have uncovered the venireman's ability to set aside her personal
feelings and follow the jury instructions.6 2 The court observed
59 See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1526 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1230 (1984); Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1003 (1982); Woodards v. Cardwell, 430 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1970). But see Williams
v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214 (1983). In Williams, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished Granviel and applied the twopronged Witherspoon test to approve the exclusion of a juror for cause. See id. at
385-86. The voir dire of one of the jurors excluded in Williams paralleled the voir
dire of the excluded juror in Granviel, in which the Fifth Circuit held that the venireman had been improperly excluded. Compare Williams, 679 F.2d at 384-85 (questioning of excluded jurors) with Granviel, 655 F.2d at 684-90 (questioning of several
veniremen). Nevertheless, the Williams court upheld the defendant's death sentence, noting that the excluded veniremen were "firm" in their unwillingness to
impose capital punishment. Williams, 679 F.2d at 386.
60 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980).
61 Id. at 398.

62 Id. at 397-98. The colloquy between the prosecutor and the potential juror
proceeded as follows:
Q. [By the prosecutor] All right. Let me ask you this question, a sentence of life imprisonment or death is mandatory on conviction of a
capital penalty case, you understand that?
A. Yes, sir, I understand it.
Q. All right. And this is a capital felony case.
A. I don't believe in it.
Q. Ma'am?
A. I do not believe in it.
Q. Let me go into it then. You told me just then that you did not
believe in death?
A. That's right.
. All right. Then will the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life affect your deliberation on any issue of fact, which
what you just told me it will, in other words the mandatory penalty
of death or imprisonment for life will affect the deliberations on
any issue of fact in this case, is that correct?
A. That's right.
MR. GREEN: All right. Judge, we ask this juror be excused.
MR. ABALOS: I think we should ask some further questions
about this matter.
THE COURT: I don't know what you could ask. You challenge
her for cause, is that correct?
MR. WILLIAMS: That is the magic term phrase and she answered
it the way you are not supposed to.
THE COURT: Ma'am, I will excuse you. You are challenged for
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that the juror had not testified that she would "automatically"
vote against the death sentence and had not made it "unmistakably clear" that her feelings toward capital punishment would af63
fect her impartiality with respect to guilt.

While the lower Federal courts generally adopted a broad
application of Witherspoon, the state courts applied Witherspoon
narrowly.6' For example, in State v. Mathis,65 the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that a juror who had responded that he was
unsure whether he could vote for the death penalty was properly
excluded.66 The Mathis court reasoned that unless a potential juror affirmatively established his willingness to consider the death
penalty, he could properly be excluded for cause under Witherspoon.67 Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court placed the burden
cause, you will not be on the jury. You are dismissed from jury
service. Thank you very much for your attendance.
Id. at 397-98 n.2.
63 Id. at 398; see Darden v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1526 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1230 (1984). In Darden, the court held that ajuror had been improperly
excluded because the scope of the questioning had not encompassed the twopronged test articulated in footnote 21 of the Witherspoon decision. Id. at 1532. The
court stressed "that '[o]nly the most extreme and compelling prejudice against the
death penalty' " warrants dismissal of a venireman under Witherspoon. Id. at 1528
(citation omitted). The court also noted that anything less than unmistakable clarity in establishing juror bias must be resolved in favor of allowing the venireman to
sit on the jury. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the Darden court determined that the
juror exclusion issue was a mixed question of law and fact, which required independent appellate review. Id. at 1530.
The Supreme Court subsequently vacated the decision in Darden and directed
the Eleventh Circuit to reconsider its opinion in light of Witt. See Wainwright v.
Darden, 105 S. Ct. 1158 (1985). After a review of its prior reasoning, the court of
appeals determined that the trial judge's exclusion of the juror at issue was consistent with the standard established in Witt. See Darden v. Wainwright, 767 F.2d 752,
754 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 2464 (1986).
64 See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 225 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1969), rev'd mem. sub nom. Wilson
v. Florida, 403 U.S. 947 (1971); Ladetto v. Commonwealth, 356 Mass. 541, 254
N.E.2d 415 (1969), rev'd mem. sub nom. Ladetto v. Massachusetts, 403 U.S. 947
(1971); State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 245 A.2d 20 (1968), rev'd mem. sub nom. Mathis
v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 946 (1971); State v. Pruett, 18 Ohio St. 2d 167, 248 N.E.2d
605 (1969), rev'd mem. sub noma. Pruett v. Ohio, 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
65 52 N.J. 238, 245 A.2d 20 (1968), rev'd mem. sub nom. Mathis v. NewJersey, 403
U.S. 946 (1971).
66 Id. at 248, 245 A.2d at 26.
67 Id. The Mathis court stated:
The State is entitled to ajuror who is impartial, i.e., one who is capable
of considering whether the death sentence may be meet [sic]. Impartiality is a positive attribute. Its presence must appear affirmatively. If a
juror, acknowledging racial, religious, or ethnic bias against an accused,
is unable to say whether he could or could not judge the case on the
merits, he is not an impartial juror. So here, the State is entitled to a
juror who can at least assure the Court that he will judge.
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of establishing a juror's impartiality on the defendant rather than
requiring that the prosecutor unmistakably demonstrate the
venireman's opposition to the death penalty. 68 Subsequently, the

United States Supreme Court summarily reversed the New Jersey
court's decision.69
Similarly, in Wilson v. State,70 the Florida Supreme Court also
interpreted Witherspoon narrowly. In Wilson, the court permitted
the exclusion of nineteen jurors.7 ' One juror testified that he
could remain impartial with respect to the question of guilt, but
could not return a sentence of death.72 Three veniremen were
uncertain whether they could return a guilty verdict knowing that
death might be the penalty. 73 The other fifteen excluded jurors
testified that they definitely could not return a verdict of guilty
knowing that the death sentence might be imposed.7 4 Again, the
reversed the state
United States Supreme Court summarily
75
court's exclusion of these veniremen.
Between 1971 and 1977, the Supreme Court continued to
apprise the country's trial courts that its decision in Witherspoon
required a two-pronged test and a high standard of proof.7 6 Dur77
ing this period, however, the Court decided Furman v. Georgia
and Gregg v. Georgia,7 which declared the death penalty unconstitutional when imposed by a capital sentencing jury invested with
Id. (footnote omitted).
For similar reasons, the NewJersey Supreme Court in State v. Forcella, 52 N.J.
263, 245 A.2d 181 (1968), rev'd mem. sub nom. Funicello v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 948
(1971) upheld the exclusion of a juror whose testimony revealed apprehension in
imposing the death sentence. Id. at 291-92, 245 A.2d at 196.
68 See Mathis, 52 N.J. at 248, 245 A.2d at 26. Under Mathis, a juror whose impartiality was not affirmatively demonstrated by the defendant could be excluded. See
id. In contrast, under the test articulated in footnote 21 of the Witherspoon decision,
potential jurors were properly excluded only if the prosecutor established that they
would automatically vote against the death penalty. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522
n.2 1.
69 Mathis v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
70 225 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1969), rev'd mem. sub nom. Wilson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 947
(1971).
71 Id. at 327.
72 Id.

73 Id.
74 Id.

75 Wilson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 947 (1971). By reversing these state court decisions, the United States Supreme Court indicated that Witherspoon required a
stricter standard for juror exclusion. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
76 See, e.g., Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (holding that a death sentence
cannot stand if even one juror was excluded in violation of Witherspoon).
77 408 U.S. 238 (1972).

78 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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unlimited discretion in its choice of penalty. 79 In response to

Furman and Gregg, most states enacted capital punishment
schemes that required jurors to answer statutory questions 80 or
weigh aggravating and mitigating factors in arriving at the appropriate sentence. 8 ' Consequently, juries were no longer permitted to impose discretionary sentences; rather, they were required
to make factual determinations that resulted in statutorily imposed sentences.82
83
In 1978, the Supreme Court's decision in Lockett v. Ohio

signaled a move away from strict adherence to the two-pronged

Witherspoon test. 84 In Lockett, the petitioner was convicted of "ag-

gravated murder with specifications" and sentenced to death. 85
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the petitioner
contended that four prospective jurors had been improperly excluded under the principles enunciated in Witherspoon.86 In rejecting this assertion, the Supreme Court focused only on the
issue of whether the excluded veniremen had made "it 'unmistakably clear ...

that their attitude toward the death penalty would

prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.' "87 Although the Lockett Court departed from the
traditional two-pronged analysis of Witherspoon, it left intact the
79 See id. at 189, 195 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion); cf. McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183, 196 (1971) (one year prior to Furman, Court held that standardless
jury discretion was not unconstitutional). See generally Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1690, 1692-99 (1974)
(discussing Furman). After Furman declared the death penalty unconstitutional, several courts determined that Witherspoon was moot. See, e.g., Guice v. State, 267 So.
2d 819, 820 (Fla. 1972); Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499, 504 (Fla. 1972).
80 See, e.g., infra note 92 (Texas capital punishment statute).
81 See Note, supra note 79, at 1699-1700; see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (Georgia statute specified 10 aggravating circumstances).
In Gregg, the jury was also permitted to consider any applicable mitigating circumstances. Id. at 164. Similarly, in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), the applicable statute specified eight aggravating factors and seven mitigating circumstances
to be considered by the jury. See id. at 248 n.6; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 113(c)(4), (5) (West 1982) (list of New Jersey's aggravating and mitigating factors).
82 See Note, supra note 79, at 1699-1701; see also Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 851 (postFurman capital punishment statutes eliminated jury discretion).
83 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
84 See id. at 595-96.
85 Id. at 593-94.
86 Id. at 595. In addition to her attack on the exclusion of the four potential
jurors, Lockett maintained that the prosecutor's closing argument was improper.
Id. at 594-95. She also argued that the statute under which she was convicted failed
to provide adequate notice of the offenses that it prohibited. Id. at 597. The Court
rejected both of these contentions. Id. at 595, 597.
87 Id. at 596 (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21).
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high standard of proof required to exclude a venireman under
88
this test.
Two years later, the Supreme Court again refined the Witherspoon holding. 9 In Adams v. Texas, 90 the Court was faced with the
applicability of Witherspoon to a bifurcated capital trial. 9 Initially,
the Court noted that unlike the Witherspoon jury, which possessed
unlimited discretion in imposing the death sentence, the Adams
jury was guided by statutory questions. 2 Nonetheless, the Court
88 See id.; see also Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 863-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that
departure from the two-pronged test did not alter the high level of proof required
for exclusion of a venireman under Witherspoon).
89 See Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
90 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
91 Id. at 43. A bifurcated trial consists of two separate parts. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 148 (5th ed. 1979). During the first phase of a bifurcated capital punishment proceeding, the jury decides the guilt or innocence of the defendant. THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 250 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982). In a subsequent proceeding after a finding of guilt, the jury applies specific statutory criteria and determines
whether to impose a death sentence. Id.; see also Note, Furman to Gregg: The Judicial and Legislative History, 22 How. L.J. 53, 87 (1979) (sentence determined by postconviction sentencing hearing). For the bifurcated process employed by the State
of Texas in the Adams case, see TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981). See also
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3(c) (West 1982) (outlining New Jersey's bifurcated process).
The Adams Court noted that the bifurcated procedure used by Texas in capital
punishment cases differed from the statute involved in the Witherspoon case in three
respects:
(1) the Witherspoonjury assessed punishment at the same time as it rendered its verdict, whereas in Texas the jury considers punishment in a
subsequent penalty proceeding; (2) the Witherspoon jury was given unfettered discretion to impose the death sentence or not, whereas the discretion of a Texas jury is circumscribed by the requirement that it
impartially answer the statutory questions; and (3) the Witherspoon jury
directly imposed the death sentence, whereas Texas juries merely give
answers to the statutory questions, which in turn determine the sentence
pronounced by the trial judge.
Adams, 448 U.S. at 45-46.
92 Adams, 448 U.S. at 45-46. The Texas statute provided for a mandatory sentence of death if all of the following questions were answered in the affirmative by
the jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of
the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 37.071 (b) (Vernon 1981). If any of these three questions were
answered in the negative, the statute mandated a sentence of life imprisonment. See
id. art. 37.071(e).
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reasoned that even in a bifurcated trial, jurors must exercise dis93
cretion and judgment in abiding by their oath and instructions.
Thus, the Court concluded that Witherspoon clearly applied to a
bifurcated capital punishment proceeding.94
After reaching this conclusion, the Adams Court then focused
on the issue of whether the trial court's exclusion of several veniremen under a Texas statute 95 violated the Witherspoon standard.96 Seven jurors had been excluded by the trial judge
because they could not state under oath that Texas's mandatory
death sentence would not affect their consideration of any issues
of fact. 9 7 While the Court recognized that the state had a legitimate interest in obtaining jurors able to follow the law, it ultimately concluded that the Texas statute provided for juror
exclusion on grounds broader than that permitted by
Witherspoon.98
The Adams Court began its analysis by noting that Witherspoon
did not supply a basis for excluding jurors. 99 Rather, the Court
reasoned, Witherspoon and its progeny had limited a state's power
to exclude veniremen by clearly establishing "that a juror may
not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair
the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath."' 0 0 The majority further observed that
if a juror's personal beliefs did not prejudice him to the extent
that he would exceed the limits imposed on juror discretion by
the Texas death penalty law, he could not properly be excluded.'O° The Court opined that ajuror must demonstrate both
a recognition that the death penalty is appropriate in some cirAdams, 448 U.S. at 46.
Id. at 45.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (Vernon 1974). The statute at issue
provided that prospective jurors were to be disqualified from service if the
mandatory death penalty would "affect his deliberations on any issue of fact." Id.
93
94
95

96 Adams, 448 U.S. at 47.

97 Id. at 40, 42, 50 nn. 7-8.
98 Id. at 49. The Court noted that jurors were excluded for statements that "apparently meant only that the potentially lethal consequences of their decision
would invest their deliberations with greater seriousness." Id.
99 Id. at 47-48. Reasoning that the Witherspoon decision instead restricted the
state's power to exclude potential jurors, the Court stated that "if prospective jurors are barred from jury service because of their views about capital punishment
on 'any broader basis' than inability to follow the law or abide by their oaths, the
death sentence cannot be carried out." Id. at 48 (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at
522 n.21).
100 Id. at 45.
101 Id. at 46-47.
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cumstances and an ability
to answer the statutory questions with02

1
out bias or distortion.

The Court then examined the Texas statute in light of these
observations to determine whether it passed constitutional muster under Witherspoon.'°0 The majority noted that the Texas statute focused on whether the possible death sentence "would have
any effect at all on the jurors' performance of their duties."' 1 4 Justice White pointed out, however, that the relevant inquiry should
be whether the potential jurors could follow the jury instructions
and properly answer the questions bearing on the imposition of
the death penalty.' 5 The Court reasoned that the Texas statute's emphasis on "any effect at all" had excluded prospective
jurors merely because they acknowledged "that the potentially
lethal consequences of their decision would invest the deliberations with greater seriousness and gravity or would involve them
emotionally."' 01 6 Accordingly, the Adams majority concluded that
the Texas juror exclusion provision ran afoul of the defendant's
sixth and fourteenth amendment rights under Witherspoon.' ° 7
While the Adams decision clearly indicated that it was no
longer necessary to establish that a juror would automatically
vote against the death penalty,'0 8 it was uncertain whether the
high standard of proof necessary to exclude a prospective juror
under Witherspoon remained unaltered. Five years later, the Court
eliminated this uncertainty when it emphasized in Witt that Adams
had indeed changed the standard of proof required by Witherspoon.'
The Witt Court held that a potential juror's steadfast
opposition to the death penalty need not be established with
"unmistakable clarity"; the sixth and fourteenth amendments required only a showing that the venireman's views would "'substantially impair the performance of his duties
as a juror' " in
0
order to warrant his exclusion from the jury."
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Rehnquist initially contrasted the duties of present-day capital sentencing juries with the duties of the jury in Witherspoon." He noted that the
Id.
See
Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 See
109 See
102
103
104

11O
'''

at 46.
id. at 49.
(emphasis added).

at 49-50.

at 50.
supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 851, 852.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 851.
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Witherspoon jury possessed unlimited discretion in determining
the defendant's sentence. 1 2 Because the range of permissible
sentences at the time of the Witherspoon decision included the
death penalty, Justice Rehnquist observed that a juror at least
had to be able to consider it as an alternative in order to fulfill his
oath." l3 Consequently, according to Justice Rehnquist, Witherspoon gave the state the power to exclude a potential juror who
would refuse to consider the death penalty as a possible sentencing alternative.' 4
The Witt majority pointed out, however, that Furman and
Gregg had eliminated the jury's discretion in determining the appropriate penalty.' ' 5 Justice Rehnquist observed that the defendant's sentence is now determined by the jurors' answers to
specific factual questions. 1 6 Thus, the majority concluded that
the first prong of the Witherspoon standard relating to the "automatic" vote against the death penalty is no longer applicable.' 17
The Court declared that the state need only show that the venireman would reject the state's capital punishment scheme and refuse to answer the trial judge's questions truthfully." l8
Justice Rehnquist then noted that Witherspoon's second
prong-a juror's ability to determine guilt objectively-is better
measured by the standard set forth in Adams. 1 ' The majority
opined that this standard lowered the burden of proof necessary
to show juror bias. 120 Justice Rehnquist observed that the proper
test should be one that allows the trial judge broad discretion in
ruling on challenges for cause. 12 ' He reasoned that many poten112 Id. The Witherspoonjury had "broad discretion to decide whether or not death
is 'the proper penalty' in a given case." Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519.
113 Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 851.
114 Id.

115 Id. For a discussion of the Furman and Gregg decisions, see supra notes 77-82
and accompanying text.
116 Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 851. After Furman, roughly two-thirds of the states redrafted their capital punishment statutes. See Note, supra note 91, at 84-9 1. For an
example of a current death penalty statute that requires the jurors to answer specific factual questions, see supra note 92.
117 Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 851.
118 Id.
119 Id. For a statement of the standard articulated in Adams, see supra note 100
and accompanying text. Justice Rehnquist argued that the Adams test was preferable for these reasons: (1) it was consistent with the role of present-day capital sentencing juries, (2) the test articulated in footnote 21 of Witherspoon was dicta, and
(3) the Adams standard was in harmony with the standards of juror exclusion in
noncapital cases. Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 851.
120 Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 851.
121 Id. at 853.
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tial jurors may be unable to express their true feelings about capital punishment at voir dire. 122 Therefore, Justice Rehnquist
maintained that a venireman's views toward the death penalty
could best be gauged by the trial judge's examination of that individual's demeanor and credibility. 123 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that a venireman could be excluded from jury service
if his attitude toward capital punishment would significantly hin124
der the proper discharge of his responsibilities as a juror.
The Witt majority next addressed the issue of the amount of
deference to be accorded in a Federal habeas corpus proceeding
1 25
to a state court's determination that a venireman was biased.
The Court first noted that in habeas corpus proceedings, "a federal reviewing court is required to accord any findings of the
state courts on 'factual issues' a 'presumption of correctness.' "', 26 Relying on Patton v. Yount,1 27 Justice Rehnquist stated
that the issue of juror bias is strictly a question of fact, which is
not subject to independent appellate review.' 28 The Court recognized that a previous decision by a lower Federal court had
held that the exclusion of prospective jurors under Witherspoon
was a "mixed question of law and fact."'' 29 The Court rejected
this interpretation, however, because it was based on the misconception that footnote twenty-one of Witherspoon had "imposed 'a
strict legal standard' and 'a very high standard of proof.' ,,'30
Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the standard for excluding
prospective jurors in capital cases is actually the same as the stan122 Id. at 852. Justice Rehnquist noted that the voir dire may never make it unmistakably clear what a juror will do at trial. Id. He stated that the trial judge's
decision to exclude a venireman for cause "cannot be reduced to question-andanswer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism." Id.
123 See id. at 852-53, 854.
124 Id. at 852. The Court applied this standard to the case at bar and determined
that the court of appeals had erred because it had focused on whether the prospective juror's answers indicated that she would automatically reject the death penalty.
Id. at 853.
125 Id. The Court addressed this issue because it believed there were parts of the
lower court's opinion that were consistent with Adams. Id.
126 Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982).
127 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
128 Witt, 105 S.Ct. at 854.
129 Id. at 855. The Court noted that Darden v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1526 (11 th
Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1230 (1984) espoused the "mixed question of law and
fact" view. Will, 105 S.Ct. at 855.
130 Witt, 105 S.Ct. at 855 (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1526, 1528
(1 th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1230 (1984)). In Darden, the Eleventh Circuit adhered strictly to the "automatic vote" requirement of footnote 21 of Witherspoon.
See Darden, 725 F.2d at 1528; see also supra note 63 (subsequent history of Darden).
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dard of exclusion in all other cases.' He reasoned that issues of
juror bias are essentially questions of credibility, which are best
resolved by the trial judge. 13 2 Accordingly, the majority concluded that a state court's findings with respect to juror exclusion
are determinations of fact, which must be accorded a "presump33
tion of correctness" by a Federal reviewing court.1
The Court then applied the enunciated principles to the
facts of the case at bar. 3 4 In reaching its ultimate conclusion that
the challenged venireman was properly excluded, 13 5 the Court
rejected Witt's contention that the trial judge's decision to excuse a juror required a written opinion.' 3 6 According to Justice
Rehnquist, the transcript of the voir dire served as an accurate
account of the judge's findings, and therefore a written opinion
was not necessary to ensure that the correct standard was
37
applied. 1

The Court similarly rejected Witt's claim that the trial judge
had applied an improper standard when he excluded the challenged panel member. 13 The majority observed that where the
record contains no reference to the standard employed, application of the correct standard is presumed. 139 Moreover, the Witt
Court noted that the transcript of the voir dire of other jurors
indicated that the trial judge had applied the proper standard."°
Finally, the Court addressed Witt's contention that the prosecutor's voir dire of the excluded juror did not establish the level
131 Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 855.

132 See id. Justice Rehnquist noted that the trial judge must apply "some kind of
legal standard to what he sees and hears, but his predominant function in determining juror bias involves credibility findings whose basis cannot be easily discerned
from an appellate record." Id.
133 Id. at 854, 856.
134 See id. at 855-58.
135 Id. at 855.
136 Id. The respondent's argument was based on 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which requires an adequate written indicia of the state trial judge's findings. See Witt, 105 S.
Ct. at 855.
137 Id. The Court noted that its conclusion was bolstered by the lack of viable
alternatives. Id. The Court declined to require the trial court to produce a written
memorandum discussing why each potential juror had been excused. Id. In addition, the Court refused to require the trial judge to state specifically his conclusion
of bias, noting that such a finding is clearly evident from the record. Id.
138 Id. at 856. Witt argued that there was no way to determine if the proper standard had been applied because the trial judge did not question the excluded juror.
Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. The Court noted that although the judge did not participate in the questioning of the excluded juror, he did question other jurors. Id. These questions
were consistent with the standard articulated in the Adams decision. Id.
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of bias required by Adams. 4 ' Witt argued that the prosecutor's
use of the word "interfere" instead of the phrase "prevent or
substantially impair" created a level of ambiguity unacceptable
under the Adams standard. 42 In rejecting this assertion, the
Court noted that the voir dire questions need not be phrased in
the specific language of the Adams opinion. 4 ' The majority
opined that the trial judge was permitted to assess the venire
member's demeanor and resolve any semantic ambiguity in favor
of the prosecution.' 4 4 The Court therefore concluded that the
factual findings of the trial court4 were
correct and reversed the
5
decision of the court of appeals.

While Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment of the
Court, he refused to join the majority's opinion because it contained language inconsistent with the Adams standard.' 4 6 Justice
Stevens reasoned that the defense counsel's failure to object or
to attempt rehabilitation of the excluded juror was actually the
critical factor in a proper disposition of the case.147 He observed
that the defendant's lawyer had objected to the exclusion of several apparently more biased veniremen.' 4' According to Justice
Stevens, this fact "len[t] credence to the hypothesis that competent trial counsel could well have made a deliberate decision not
to object to the exclusion of [the venire member] because he did
not want her to serve as a juror." 149 Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that although this juror may have been excluded in violation of the Adams standard, the failure to object rendered the
50
error harmless. 1

In a strong dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, criticized the majority opinion for its abandonment of
See id. at 856-57.
Id. at 857.
Id.
Id. at 857-58.
Id. at 858.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that
Witherspoon constitutes a limitation on a state's power to exclude, rather than a basis
for excluding jurors. Id. at 858 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring). He also agreed that
the proper standard for excluding a potential juror is the test articulated in Adams.
Id. at 858 (Stevens, J., concurring).
147 Id. at 858 & n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens noted that the majority had properly identified this fact. Id. at 858 (Stevens, J., concurring). He
reasoned that defense counsel's failure to object to the exclusion of the potential
juror was a tactical decision, which indicated that defense counsel believed the error was not critical to his client's case. See id. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring).
148 See id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 859 & n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring).
141

142
143
144
145
146
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Witherspoon's strict standard of proof.'
Initially, the dissent
noted that in cases involving noncapital offenses, the state possesses significant leeway in excusing for cause prospective jurors
who indicate that they may be unable to remain impartial. 52 Justice Brennan reasoned that "[a]lthough . . . exclusion on 'any
broader basis' than a juror's unambiguously expressed inability
to follow instructions and abide by an oath serves no legitimate
State interest," it likewise "disserves no interest of the defend53
ant" and therefore is harmless to noncapital cases.1
The dissent contrasted this proposition with cases involving
the possibility of the death penalty.154 Justice Brennan noted
that in capital cases, exclusion of those opposed to the death
penalty is likely to create a skewed jury. 5 5 He feared that such
juries would be unlikely to approximate a fair cross-section of the
community and would therefore violate the defendant's sixth
amendment right to an impartial jury.' 5 6 The dissent acknowledged, however, that the state's interest in an unbiased jury in151 See id. at 860 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Initially, Justice Brennan noted that he
would have affirmed the court of appeals' decision because of his belief that the
death sentence constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
Eighth and Fourteenth amendments." Id. Justice Brennan further declared that
even if his views on capital punishment were other than what they were, he would
have voted to affirm the court of appeals' decision because "basic justice demands
that juries with the power to decide whether a capital defendant lives or dies not be
poisoned against the defendant." Id.
152 Id. at 861 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Prior to Witherspoon, the state possessed
the same leeway for excluding jurors in capital cases. See Turberville v. United
States, 303 F.2d 411, 419 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 946 (1962); Horton v.
United States, 15 App. D.C. 310, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1899).
153 Will, 105 S. Ct. at 861 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
154 See id. Justice Brennan noted that "[t]he Court's crucial perception in Witherspoon was that such broad exclusion of prospective jurors on the basis of the possible effect of their views about capital punishment infringes the rights of a capital
defendant in a way that broad exclusion for indicia of other kinds of bias does not."
Id.
155 Id. Justice Brennan reasoned that excluding all scrupled jurors "keeps an
identifiable class of people off the jury." Id. Therefore, a skew results. Id.
156 Id. In his dissent, Justice Brennan stressed the right to a jury trial as a safeguard " 'against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased, or eccentric judge.' " Id. at 870 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)). Justice Brennan noted that the Court had
held in Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) and in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 533 (1975) that the jury body must be representative of the community
without excluding large, distinctive groups. Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 870 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). While those cases dealt with the cross-section of the venire, Justice
Brennan argued that the same principles should apply to a particular jury ultimately picked from the supposedly representative venire. Id. at 870 n. 10 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). The Court recently rejected Justice Brennan's argument. See Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1764-65 (1986).
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cluded the right to exclude prospective jurors whose opinions
about capital punishment would prevent them from following the
law.' 5 7 Justice Brennan reasoned that the Witherspoon standard
accommodated both the defendant's rights and the state's interests by permitting exclusion of veniremen "whose views would
prevent them from being impartial but requiring strict standards
of proof for exclusion." 158
The dissent next observed that the Witherspoon standard effectively allocated to the prosecution "the cost of unavoidable
uncertainty with respect to whether a prospective juror with
scruples about capital punishment should be excluded."' t5 9 Justice Brennan analogized this concept to that of "the 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' standard of guilt [which] allocates to
the State the cost of uncertainty with respect to whether a particular defendant committed a crime."' 60 Justice Brennan claimed
that the reason the law had imposed an extremely high standard
of proof for exclusion of jurors in capital cases was that the fundamentals of criminal justice viewed a defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial jury as greater than the state's interest
in administering its death penalty scheme.' 6 ' He noted that the
Court had traditionally viewed the risk that a defendant's sixth
amendment right might be violated through improper exclusion
of a juror as far more serious than
the risk to the prosecution of
62
inclusion of a scrupled juror.1

The dissent then addressed the two-part inquiry expressed
in footnote twenty-one of the Witherspoon decision.'

63

Justice

Brennan remarked that while permissible voir dire questions may
depart from the language of footnote twenty-one,' 64 they must
still comply with the strict standard of proof required under
Witherspoon. 165 According to the dissent, "the essence of Wither105 S. Ct. at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. Justice Brennan stated that Witherspoon precluded excusing for cause undecided jurors, vacillating jurors, and jurors who would view a capital case with
greater scrutiny than a noncapital case. Id.
157 Witt,
158

159 Id.
160 Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-73 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
161 Id at 861 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that a perfectly
neutral jury was impossible to obtain. Id. (citing Gross, Determining the Neutrality of
Death-QualifiedJuries, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 7, 26-28 (1984)).
162 Id. at 863 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163 See id.
164 Id. at 863-64 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citing Adams, 448 U.S. at 44-45; Lockett,
438 U.S. at 595-96).
165 Id. at 864 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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spoon is its requirement that only jurors who make it unmistakably
clear that their views about capital punishment would prevent or
substantially impair them from following the law may be excluded."1 66 justice Brennan observed that the trial court had allowed the challenged juror to be excused for cause merely
because she admitted that her feelings would interfere with her
determination. 67 This alone, the dissent reasoned, failed 1to
68
meet the strict standards of proof articulated in Witherspoon.
The dissent therefore concluded that both the court of appeals'
69
application of the law and its analysis of the facts were correct.

The dissent next considered the Court's finding that the Adams decision had renounced Witherspoon's stringent measure of
proof ofjuror bias.170 In contrast to the majority, Justice Brennan
maintained that the Adams decision had reaffirmed the Witherspoon
criteria. 17 ' He characterized the majority's decision as a debasement of the sixth amendment and noted that by discarding
Witherspoon's stringent standards, the majority had effectively
shifted "the72risk of a biased and unrepresentative jury" to the
defendant. 1

Id.
See id. at 865 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 864 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 864-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 866 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that the majority's decision left no distinction between capital and noncapital juror exclusion issues. Id.
171 See id. Justice Brennan noted that the Court in Adams quoted with approval
the "unmistakably clear" language from Witherspoon's footnote 21. Id.; see also Adams, 448 U.S. at 44 (quoting footnote 21 of Witherspoon). Justice Brennan's conclusion was based in part on the fact that many lower courts had read the Adams
decision as an approval of the strict legal standard of proof set forth in Witherspoon.
Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 866 (Brennan,J., dissenting); see, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 725
F.2d 1526, 1528-29 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1230 (1984); Davis v. Zant, 721
F.2d 1478, 1486 (11th Cir. 1983), rev'dsub nom. on othergrounds on reh'gen banc, Davis
v. Kemp, 752 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2689 (1985); Spencer v.
Zant, 715 F.2d 1562, 1576 (11 th Cir. 1983); Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 954 (11 th
Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983); O'Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 706, 709 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1013 (1984); Burns v. Estelle, 626 F.2d 396, 397-98
(5th Cir. 1980); People v. Velasquez, 28 Cal. 3d 461, 462, 622 P.2d 952, 953, 171
Cal. Rptr. 507, 508 (1980); Herring v. State, 446 So. 2d 1049, 1055 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 105 S.Ct. 396 (1984); People v. Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342, 351-52, 430 N.E.2d
1046, 1051 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1,
6 (Mo.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981).
172 Witt, 105 S.Ct. at 867 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The New Jersey Supreme
Court's decision in State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 245 A.2d 20 (1968), rev'd mem. sub.
nom. Mathis v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 946 (1971) similarly shifted this risk to the
defendant. For a discussion of that case, see supra notes 65-69 and accompanying
text.
166
167
168
169
170
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Finally, the dissent attacked the majority's discussion of the
proper standard of review to be applied to Witherspoon determinations made by state courts. 1 73 Initially, Justice Brennan inferred
that one objective of the majority's abandonment of the strict requirements of Witherspoon was "to bring review of death-qualification questions within the scope of the presumption of correctness
174
of state court factual findings on federal collateral review."'
The dissent reasoned, however, that had the Court maintained
the Witherspoon standard, this issue would be a mixed question of
law and fact and thus not subject to the statutory presumption of
correctness.1 7 5 Justice Brennan further maintained that, even
under the majority's new standard, it did not necessarily follow
that a state court's Witherspoon determination should be afforded
a presumption of correctness. 17 6 Thus, the dissent concluded
that the Court's finding that a state court's Witherspoon finding
should be afforded a presumption of correctness "thwart[ed]
1 77
[the] vindication of fundamental rights in the federal courts. ''
By abandoning the demanding burden of proof for juror exclusion in capital cases, the Witt Court has returned the standard
to its pre-Witherspoon level. The traditional approach to juror exclusion in both capital and noncapital cases was for a court to
consider only whether a juror would be influenced by a factor
affecting impartiality.17 8
Further questioning to ascertain
whether a juror could put aside his bias and follow the law was
unnecessary. ' 79 The rationale was that a party had no legitimate
80
legal interest in retaining a juror prejudiced in his favor.
The Witherspoon decision, however, established that a capital
defendant's right to an impartial jury demanded retention ofju173 See Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 872 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174 Id.
175 Id. Justice Brennan defined "mixed question" as the "application of a legal
standard to undisputed historical fact." Id. He reasoned that the review of juror
exclusion issues necessitates the application of a legal standard to the venireman's
undisputed opinions. See id. Justice Brennan therefore concluded that the determination of whether a capital sentencing juror was properly excluded is a mixed question of law and fact. Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See id. at 851-52, 855. Prior to Witherspoon, a state could properly exclude
prospective jurors merely because they were opposed to the death penalty. See, e.g.,
People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 575-76, 305 P.2d 1, 7 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
930 (1957); Commonwealth v. Ladetto, 349 Mass. 237, 246, 207 N.E.2d 536, 542
(1965).
179 See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 539 (Black, J., dissenting).
180 See Horton v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 310, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1899).
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rors with reservations about the death penalty so long as they
were not "irrevocably committed ...

to vote against the penalty

of death."'' Accordingly, Witherspoon and its progeny required
an unmistakable showing by the prosecutor that a juror could not
be impartial in the performance of his duties. 82 In so doing, the
Witherspoon Court properly disposed of the assumption that veniremen with misgivings about capital punishment could not put
them aside and objectively follow their oath. 8 3 The Witt Court,
however, has abandoned the requirement that a venireman make
it unmistakably clear that his views toward the death penalty will
8 4
prevent him from abiding by his oath and following the law,1
thus returning the standard for juror exclusion in capital cases to
the same level required for juror exclusion in noncapital cases.
The Witt Court's conclusion that death-qualification exclusions must meet the same standard for juror exclusion in noncapital cases contravenes a number of earlier Supreme Court
decisions. Prior to Witt, the Court had expressed the view that
capital cases require greater scrutiny than noncapital cases.' 8 5
For instance, in Zant v. Stephens,' 8 6 the Court determined that because "there is a qualitative difference between death and any
other permissible form of punishment, 'there is a corresponding
difference in the need for reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.' 1187 The
Zant opinion thus recognized that the absolute finality of death as
a penalty requires a high degree of reliability in the imposition of
a capital sentence. 18 This need for reliability extends to all aspects of the capital trial, including the jury selection process. A
prosecutor may now exclude prospective jurors, however, merely
because they express reservations about the death penalty. The
chance that the resulting jury will be representative of a fair
cross-section of the community, as required by the sixth amendWitherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
See id. at 522-23 n.21.
See id. at 514 n.7.
Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 850, 852-53.
See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459-60 & n.7 (1984) (Court
stressed minimizing risk of error in imposing the death sentence); Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862, 884-85 (1983) (Court stressed reliability in determining that death is
appropriate sentence); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981) (death sentence prohibited after retrial when a defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment
upon initial conviction).
186 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
187 Id. at 884-85 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)).
188 See id.; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) (the death
penalty "is unique in its total irrevocability").
181
182
183
184
185
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ment, is slim. 189 Consequently, there is a much greater possibility that the death sentence will be wrongfully imposed. Thus, the
Witt Court's departure from the strict standard of proof required
by Witherspoon has impaired both the reliability of the capital sentencing process and the criminal defendant's sixth amendment
right to an impartial jury.
Although the Witt Court properly recognized that the evolution of the capital sentencing jury has rendered the first prong of
the Witherspoon test inapplicable,' 90 the majority's abandonment
of the second prong and its departure from Witherspoon's high
burden of proof were unwarranted. In support of its conclusion
that the required burden of proof had been lowered, the Witt majority cited the Adams decision. 9 ' Justice Rehnquist noted that
the jury involved in the Adams decision was required to answer
questions regarding the nature of the crime.' 9 2 The answers to
these questions then determined the sentence that was imposed
under the capital sentencing statute. 19 3 Nevertheless, the Adams
Court concluded that ajuror's views on capital punishment could
still affect his ability to answer the required questions objectively.' 9 4 Thus, while the Adams Court did not specifically state
that a juror must make it "unmistakably clear" that his answers
would be consciously distorted or biased, it is apparent that the
Adams Court in fact applied a test that closely resembled the
19 5
Witherspoon standard.
189 Witt, 105 S.Ct. at 861 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Adams, 448 U.S. at 50;
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519-20). Justice Brennan correctly noted that
broad exclusion of prospective jurors on the basis of the possible effect
of their views about capital punishment infringes the rights of a capital
defendant in a way that broad exclusion for indicia of other kinds of bias
does not. No systematic skew in the nature of jury composition results
from exclusion of individuals for random idiosyncratic traits likely to
lead to bias. Exclusion of those opposed to capital punishment, by contrast, keeps an identifiable class of people off the jury in capital cases
and is likely systematically to bias juries. Such juries are more likely to
be hanging juries, tribunals more disposed in any given case to impose a
sentence of death.
Id. (citing Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523).
190 See id. at 851.
191 Id. at 851, 852.
192 Id. at 851.
193 Id.; see supra note 92.
194 See Adams, 448 U.S. at 46.
195 Compare Adams, 448 U.S. at 45 (juror exclusion standard) with Witherspoon, 391
U.S. at 522 n.21 (same). The Adams Court stated that "neither nervousness, emotional involvement, nor inability to deny or confirm any effect whatsoever is
equivalent to an unwillingness or an inability on the part of the jurors to follow the
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Even if the Adams decision is construed to have lowered the
standard for juror exclusion, the jury that tried Witt possessed a
brand of discretion closer to that present in Witherspoon rather
than Adams. The Adams jury's discretion was unique in that it involved answering specific, statutorily-imposed questions. 96 By
contrast, most states' capital sentencing schemes require the jury
to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining whether the death sentence should be imposed.' 9 7 Before
the death penalty may be inflicted, the jury is required to find the
existence of at least one aggravating circumstance.' 98 At that
point, the jury possesses absolute discretion in determining the
presence of an aggravating circumstance. Thus, present-day juries are in essentially the same position as the Witherspoon jury.
Hence, the strict standard of proof required by Witherspoon
should remain intact.
Admittedly, the task of determining whether a prospective
juror's views on capital punishment will prohibit him from properly applying the law or impartially viewing the facts is not an
easy one. In fact, there is a substantial possibility that many trial
judges may deny the exclusion of venire members who actually
should be excused. As Justice Brennan noted, however, this is a
risk that the state must bear.' 99 The sixth amendment requires
that protection of a defendant's right to an impartial jury be
more solicitous than protection of the state's right to administer
its capital punishment scheme. 20 0 The strict standard of proof
mandated by Witherspoon would provide the necessary protection.
The Witt Court's additional conclusion that a state trial
judge's determination of juror
exclusion must be afforded a
"presumption of correctness ' 201 was clearly a consequence of its
departure from the strict measure of proof required by Witherspoon. Under the Witherspoon test, the trial judge was required to
apply a legal standard-"unmistakable clarity"-to the factual iscourt's instructions and obey their oaths, regardless of their feelings about the
death penalty." Adams, 448 U.S. at 50.
196 See supra note 92.
197 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
198 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164-65, 206 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion). Gregg required
at least one aggravating factor to be present. See id. Individual state statutes may
provide for a number of aggravating and mitigating factors, which the jury is free to
weigh or to reject totally. See supra note 81; see also NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:I 1-3(c)(4),
(5) (West 1982) (New Jersey's aggravating and mitigating factors).
199 See Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 862-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200 See id. at 863, 864 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201 See id. at 854-55.
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sue of whether the prospective juror's views on capital punishment would prohibit him from impartially determining the
defendant's guilt. 20 2 This was clearly a mixed question of law

and fact, thus permitting a Federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding to determine whether the legal standard had been correctly applied.2"' The Witt Court, however, abandoned this strict
standard of proof, and a trial judge's predominant function20in4
determining juror bias now involves findings of credibility.
Because such findings are so clearly factual in nature, the trial
judge's determinations must be given the deference afforded by
the Federal habeas corpus statute.2 °5
The ultimate decision to exclude a venire member from the
capital sentencing jury now lies almost exclusively within the discretion of the trial judge. Hence, Witt's clarification of the Witherspoon standard should facilitate trial courts' future resolutions of
this extremely sensitive issue. Unfortunately, the price for this
new simplicity may be a dilution of a capital defendant's sixth
amendment right to an impartial jury.
James F. Gizzi
202 See id. at 855.
203 See id.
204 Id.
205 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982).

